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This  paper  investigates  the  impact  of  voluntary  disclosures  on  sell-side 
analyst stock recommendations.  It uses content analysis method to measure 
quality of information disclosures and emphasis on particular themes.  The 
focus of this study is on changes in analyst recommendations and the new 
information  disclosures  that  have  been  made  public  since  the  previous 
revision  of  recommendation.    The  proxies  for  voluntary  disclosures  are 
information released by firms via company announcements and associated 
media  reports.    The  characteristics  of  these  disclosures  are  examined  to 
explore their impact on the changes in analysts’ stock recommendations.   
 
Based  on  a  sample  of  over  200  recommendation  revisions  of  40  listed 
Australian  companies,  the  results  suggest  that  voluntary  disclosures  do 
contribute to analyst stock revisions.  The findings reveal that the quantity 
of disclosures is positively associated with the number of recommendation 
revisions,  and  that  disclosures  with  favourable  signals  or  with  price-
sensitive  contents  are  significantly  related  to  the  direction  and  type  of 
analyst revisions.  In addition, disclosure of specific themes (e.g., dividend 
and  product)  in  company  announcements  and  news  are  significantly 
associated with the recommendation change.  This has implications for both 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Changes in the business environment such as globalisation, financial deregulation, and 
technological advances require that companies increasingly seek to communicate with outside 
parties to keep up with rapid growth and competition.  Healy and Palepu (2001) note that, in 
the capital market economy, corporate disclosures play an important role in spreading 
information to the relevant parties outside the companies.  Accounting information is useful to 
shareholders, suppliers, creditors, potential investors, analysts, and others because they can 
use such information to assess a business, update subjective estimations, and make effective 
decisions on investing their resources in a company.  Healy and Palepu (1993) also assert that 
information disclosure becomes a distinctive strategy as companies try to communicate 
information to the financial markets in order to raise capital.   
 
Apart from mandatory disclosures to disseminate company information, companies can 
additionally present discretionary information to accompany the mandated requirements, and 
many choose to do so.  This view is in line with the report of the Business Research Project 
by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB 2001), which studies the voluntary 
disclosure of business information.  The report (FASB 2001, p. 3) concludes that voluntary 
disclosure is useful to investors and indicates that “effective voluntary disclosure can provide 
more transparency and understanding about the company to investors and creditors”.  The 
same report also finds that there are a variety of companies currently willing to disclose some 
of their critical business information voluntarily and that voluntary disclosure appears to be 
valuable in communicating information to investors and creditors.   
 
The importance of company information is evident to users as they use such information 
for their decision-making process.  Therefore users are persons who perceive and make 
judgements as to what information is important and useful.  This corresponds to the view 
noted by Wallman (1995, p. 83) in that the value and worth of financial reporting lie in its 
usefulness to users.  The AICPA Special Committee (1994, Chapter 1-2), which studied 
users’ information needs, simply grouped users into two categories, namely professionals and 
non-professionals.  This grouping is based on skills, resources, and purposes to make 
decisions using accounting information.  However, professional users - including analysts, 
brokers, and others - are the focus of the AICPA’ report.  Professional users, especially     2 
financial analysts, generally base their decisions on superior models; they control a significant 
proportion of capital in the market; and more non-professional users tend to rely on the advice 
of professionals as the market place is constantly changing and becomes much more complex 
(AICPA 1994, Chapter 2).   
 
In this regard, Schipper (1991, p.105) notes that “it makes sense to study analyst 
decision processes because analysts are among the primary users of financial accounting 
information”. Analysts are important in the sense that they are intermediaries who receive and 
process financial information for investors.  Healy and Palepu (2001) lend support to this idea 
and conclude from their evidence that analysts create value in the capital market through their 
provision of an analysis of company information to investors.  Schipper (1991, p.112) 
summarise the major tasks of analysts as to collect company information from various sources, 
analyse company performance, make earnings forecasts, and arrive at buy/hold/sell 
recommendations.  These activities result in two kinds of analysts’ work, namely analysts’ 
earnings forecasts and analysts’ stock recommendations.  Healy and Palepu (2001, p.416) 
note that analysts’ forecasts and recommendation reports are the principal focus of academic 
research relevant to the assessment of information intermediaries.  Analysts intensely use 
financial information to reach their decisions, thus the quality of their work is influenced by 
the quality of the information they use.  Analysts, as the key users of corporate information, 
are sophisticated users who can realistically be regarded as representatives of prime user 
groups and can be assumed to be able to use information effectively.  Hence, a study of 
analysts’ work should enable us to examine the decision usefulness of corporate information.  
 
The primary purpose of this study is to contribute to the existing knowledge on how 
company voluntary disclosures are decision useful to investment analysts as major users of 
corporate information.  It aims to assess the decision usefulness of voluntary accounting 
disclosures by examining the nature of analysts’ stock recommendations.  The study examines 
the relationship between the characteristics of voluntary disclosures and the properties of 
analysts’ recommendations by observing whether voluntary disclosures are useful and 
relevant to analysts’ decision-making process given that analysts use corporate voluntary 
information to reach conclusions in their work.  It then seeks to determine the impact of the 
extent of voluntary information disclosure on the attributes of analysts’ recommendations.       3 
In doing so, this study investigates the analysts’ recommendation revisions (the changed 
rating) for company stocks.  The analysts’ recommendation revisions are central to this paper 
in measuring the decision usefulness of corporate voluntary disclosure.  After the 
recommendation revisions (revised ratings) have been gathered, the period between the old 
and new ratings can be determined, and the voluntary disclosures during the change period are 
identified and matched with the corresponding recommendation revisions.  The characteristics 
of voluntary disclosures over the same period of change are later examined to determine 
whether they can explain the properties of recommendation revision.  
 
Based on a sample of over 200 recommendation revisions of 40 listed Australian 
companies, the results suggest that voluntary disclosures
1 help to explain the variations in 
analyst recommendation revisions.  The results reveal that the quantity of disclosures is 
positively associated with the number of recommendation revisions, and that disclosures with 
favourable signals or with price-sensitive contents are significantly related to the direction and 
type of recommendation revisions.  In addition, disclosure of specific themes (e.g., dividend 
and product) in company announcements and news are significantly associated with the 
recommendation change. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised into four further sections.  Section two 
provides a review of the literature and develops hypotheses.  Section three explains the 
sample and data collected, and discusses the research method employed.  Section four reports 
the results.  Finally, Section five provides conclusions, implications, limitations and possible 
extensions of the study. 
 
2.   Literature Review, Related research and development of hypotheses 
 
2.1   Related Research 
 
The motivation for this study arises from an extensive review of the voluntary 
disclosure literature, most notably the contribution of Healy and Palepu (2001).  The literature 
shows that the benefits of voluntary disclosures have long been recognised and investigated 
from many different perspectives.  The studies on the benefits of voluntary disclosures are 
important for the current initiatives to improve the quality of business reporting process and     4 
firm disclosure strategy.  The  FASB Steering Committee Report (FASB 2001) states 
that many leading companies are voluntarily disclosing an extensive amount of information to 
investors and predicts that the importance of voluntary disclosures is expected to increase in 
the future because of the fast pace of change in the business environment. 
 
Voluntary disclosures themselves have also been proved to have importance to capital 
markets as evidenced from a number of empirical studies in this area.  Benefits of disclosures 
to the company are well-documented in the literature.  Companies making voluntary 
disclosures can gain perceived market benefits in the form of improved stock liquidity, 
reduced cost of capital, and increased information intermediation (Healy & Palepu 2001) and 
increased stock liquidity and investor attractiveness (Diamond & Verrechia 1991).  A number 
of empirical studies support these assertions:  Welker (1995) finds that firms with a well-
regarded disclosure policy have lower bid-ask spreads, which are a proxy for the information 
asymmetry component of the cost of capital; Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) find that firms 
with increased disclosures have lower bid-ask spreads and conclude that expanded disclosures 
lead to increases in stock liquidity and attract more institutional investors.  Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000) also find that firms with a higher disclosure level have lower bid-ask 
spreads and higher trading volumes, thus lowering the cost of issuing capital. Botosan (1997) 
directly observes firms’ cost of capital, and documents a relationship between firms’ 
disclosure levels and the cost of capital, finding that, for firms with a low analyst following, 
there is an association between greater disclosure and the lower cost of capital.  Botosan and 
Plumlee (2002) extend this study to include firms with high analyst following, noting the 
same negative association between the extent of disclosures observed from annual reports and 
cost of capital. 
 
The extent of voluntary disclosure varies according to firm characteristics, including 
firm size, listing status, industry environment, and firm performance (profitability and return 
variability).  In order to measure the extent of disclosure levels, the elements that could 
potentially affect the level of disclosures must be considered.  Several prior studies examine 
the determinants of cross-sectional variations in voluntary disclosure levels.  Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) use analyst ratings of firms’ disclosures as a proxy for disclosure quality, 
and examine the cross-sectional variations in analysts’ published ratings of firms’ disclosure 
practices. They find significant evidence of a positive relation between disclosure ratings and 
firm size, current performance, and new security issuance.  They find that disclosure scores     5 
increase as firm size increases, which is consistent with much of the existing research on 
voluntary disclosure.  Also, disclosure ratings are higher for firms that perform well, firms 
with a weaker relationship between annual stock returns and earnings, and firms that issue 
securities.  The relationship between the disclosure scores and firm characteristics also varies 
across sources of disclosures, with investor relations the most responsive to firm 
characteristics in their study.  This is consistent with the fact that disclosures in annual reports 
and other publications are infrequently varied, while investor relations are the most flexible 
channels over short time periods. 
 
In an investigation of factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosures by 
multinational companies, Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995) identify a number of variables (firm 
size, industry, leverage, profitability, country, and international listing status) that might be 
associated with disclosure levels, and present evidence to support a relationship with company 
size, country, and listing status. Similarly, Robb, Single and Zarzeski (2001) find that large 
companies tend to provide more disclosures.  In addition, they observe some industry effects 
on the level of disclosures, with, firms in the chemicals and construction industries providing 
higher levels of disclosure content.  Ahmed and Courtis (1999) conduct a meta-analysis 
reviewing past literature studying the association between annual report disclosure level and 
firm characteristics, and find three variables (firm size, exchange listing status, and leverage) 
to have statistically significant positive associations with firms’ disclosure levels.  
 
Beattie, McInnes and Fearnley (2002, 2004) note that information disclosed by a 
company could be part of a very large topic area; this necessitates disclosure studies having a 
narrower focus on to specific areas or subsets of information disclosure (e.g., forward-looking, 
historical, or background information; financial or nonfinancial information; environmental 
disclosures; accounting figures or narratives).  Although, all the information is essential to 
users’ decision making collectively, it is likely that the decision-relevance of information 
varies by information types.  Several studies (e.g., Eccles & Mavrinac 1995; Meek et al. 1995; 
Robb et al. 2001; Grant, Fogarty, Bricker & Previts 2000) show that different types of 
particular information items do not create equal value-relevance to users’ decision-making 
processes. 
 
There have been two approaches to the examination of the information content of 
disclosures.  The study of market reactions is one such method.  An inference is made,     6 
implying that the content of disclosures is useful, when it has an effect on stock performance 
(share prices and/or returns).  Studies including Brookfield and Morris (1992), Rippington 
and Taffler (1995), Amir and Lev (1996), Lev and Zarowin (1999), Ely and Waymire (1999), 
Francis and Schipper (1999), Francis, Schipper and Vincent (2002) have shown that corporate 
information disclosures have an impact on stock performance, providing evidence of an effect 
which implies that the disclosure is useful and has information content.  The other method, 
content analysis, investigates the information contained in disclosures and attempts to observe 
the intrinsic value (such as predictive ability) of information.  The content analysis method 
has been mainly applied to examine narrative information contained in the 
chairman/president’s letter and MD&A of firms’ operations.  Past research on thematic 
studies (e.g., Ingram & Frazier 1983; Frazier, Ingram & Tennyson 1984; Bryan 1997; Smith 
& Taffler 2000; Uang, Citron & Taffler 2001) demonstrates that the content of disclosures are 
investigated and categorised into other variables such as words, paragraphs, or themes.  
Specifically, such variables are analysed and examined with other variables of interest such as 
firm performance or accounting numbers.  Considering the syntactic aspects of the narratives, 
the study of readability also gives rise to an exploration of a possible association between 
readability level and other variables of interest.  In all, content analysis enables researchers to 
draw conclusions from the content itself, not from reactions from the stock market.   
 
Until now, much of the extant research in voluntary disclosures relies upon the use of 
annual reports as the main or only source of information.  Annual reports are important 
because they are the most comprehensive presentation of financial reporting a company 
provides to its stockholders, and would be among the most available and easily accessible 
sources of voluntary disclosures (Holland 1998; Grant et al. 2000).  However, the usefulness 
of annual reports has come under criticism for years, especially that they no longer capture 
and communicate material developments in a timely manner to meet market information 
needs (Wallman 1995). 
 
In fact, a great deal of disclosure occurs outside of the annual report as firms 
communicate information using other media, for instance, press releases, conference calls, or 
web sites.  Publicly available sources of information such as Stock Exchange and newspaper 
databases are able to provide additional information including firm-specific news as well as 
comments on companies.  In this regard, a number of studies have found an evidence of the 
usefulness of information disclosures derived from sources other than annual reports.  For     7 
example, Brown, Taylor and Walter (1999), Lang and Lundholm (2000), and Ryan and 
Taffler (2004) all find that information from the news databases or Stock Exchange do 
contain considerable value, i.e., having an impact on share prices. 
 
In the disclosure process, financial analysts have critical roles in disseminating 
corporate related information to investors, as analysts are middle agents who process 
information from companies, add value, and send out further information to investors.  There 
is increasing demand from users of company information, financial analysts in particular, for 
greater voluntary disclosures by firms.  This view is echoed by the recommendations made in 
regulatory reports (e.g., AICPA 1994; FASB 2001) to encourage firms to enhance their 
voluntary disclosures.  As part of the effort to improve the quality of business communication, 
there is a need to examine how voluntary disclosures influence analysts’ decision making 
processes and how analysts use corporate information to facilitate better decision making. 
 
Schipper (1991) states that it is reasonable to study analysts and their activities because 
they have a significant role as information intermediaries who receive and process financial 
information for investors.  This paper focuses on the activities of sell-side analysts.  The role 
and importance of sell-side analysts are echoed by Orlow (1999) as he states that sell-side 
analysts serve a very important role in the capital raising process within securities markets 
and provide insights into industry trends.  A survey by Brown (1997) shows that analysts 
greatly rely on corporate financial information, i.e., information found in annual and interim 
filings, in their decision-making processes. Several studies (e.g., Previts, Bricker, Robinson & 
Young 1994; Brown 1997; Rogers & Grant 1997; Breton & Taffler 2001) investigate 
analysts’ information usage by examining analysts’ research reports.  These studies have 
emphasised the information needs of users, particularly financial analysts, and shown that 
company information is useful to these users as it helps them make decisions about the 
investments or make projections about the future value of the company. 
 
Analysts have an important role in gathering company-related information and in 
communicating that information to the market through their outputs.  Healy and Palepu (2001) 
note that academic studies usually focus on information produced by analysts, especially their 
earnings forecasts and stock recommendations.  Analysts’ stock recommendations are derived 
as the outcomes of a process in which analysts have gathered and used all available sources of 
industry and firm-specific information for their decision.  Numerous studies (e.g., Bauman,     8 
Datta and Iskandar-Datta 1995; Stickel 1995; Womack 1996; Francis & Soffer 1997; Ho & 
Harris 1998, 2000; Ryan & Taffler 2001) provide evidence of the impact of analyst 
recommendations on stock prices and returns.   
 
Nevertheless, it has been found that these recommendations can be more informative 
and yield more powerful impacts when they have been revised and the recommendations 
changed.  Stickel (1995), Womack (1996), and  Ryan and Taffler (2001) use changes in 
recommendations to examine the informativeness of revisions in analysts’ existing 
recommendations and measure the average price reactions to such changes in individual 
analysts’ recommendations. They all find that recommendation changes are likely to draw 
more attention from investors, more value relevant and have higher market impact than the 
reiterations of existing recommendations.   
 
However, the use of analyst recommendations as the proxy for the quality of analysts’ 
work is of concern because of the potential for analyst bias in the formulation of forecasts and 
recommendations.  Brown (1993) provides evidence showing that analysts’ earnings forecasts 
are typically optimistic, and concludes that a positive bias exists in analyst earnings forecasts; 
in particular, analysts whose firms provide underwriting or investment banking services are 
likely to produce more optimistic forecasts for their customer companies. Analyst stock 
recommendations might be expected to be positively biased since they are predominantly 
“buys”.  Ryan and Taffler (2001), Ho and Harris (1998), and Womack (1996) all observe that 
buy recommendations are more frequent than sell recommendations.  This is probably due to 
the conventional understanding that the issuance of sell recommendations is unfavourable to 
both companies and analysts, making them infrequent (Womack 1996).   
 
Analysts are actively involved and create value for capital markets.  Healy and Palepu 
(2001) assert that one consequence for capital markets of a firm making voluntary disclosure 
is increased information intermediation.  There is evidence that information disclosures 
benefit analysts’ activities.  Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that firms making more 
informative disclosures are likely to have a larger analyst following, more accurate analyst 
earnings forecasts, less dispersion among individual analysts, and less volatility in forecast 
revisions.  Walker and Tsalta (2001) looks at the relation between the quality of corporate 
disclosure in annual reports and the number of analyst forecast revisions as a measurement of 
analyst following.  Their results provide evidence that there is a relationship between the     9 
quality of information disclosed in the annual report and analyst following activity.  Using 
management forecasts as a proxy for voluntary disclosures, Baginski and Hassell (1990), 
Waymire (1986) Hassell, Jennings and Lasser (1988), and Williams (1996) all find that 
management earnings forecasts lead analysts to revise their forecasts and hence improve the 
accuracy of analysts’ forecasts.  Increased analyst activities can also result from more 
frequent disclosures.  Botosan and Harris (2000) find that one of the consequences of making 
quarterly segment disclosures is that firms are likely to have an increase in analyst following 
after the period of releasing such disclosures.  This is due to analysts gaining opportunities to 
get more updated and useful information.  Increased analyst following is then consistent with 
their assertion that shifting disclosure frequency can enhance both the content and timeliness 
of information to analysts.  
 
With a number of disclosure studies, there is clearly an important issue relating to the 
measurement of voluntary disclosure levels.  Commentary on disclosure measurements from 
the observation of the existing disclosure literature (e.g., Marston & Shrives 1991; Healy & 
Palepu 2001; Beattie et al. 2004) point out that the disclosure index is a common measure of 
disclosure levels.  The utilisation of a disclosure index mainly involves the process of self-
construction of the index.  The self-developed indices may be appropriate for the purposes of 
a researcher in his/her own work, but the development and application of a disclosure index 
requires subjective assessment and involves several tasks.  For example, in the work by 
Botosan (1997), the disclosure index was developed based on an observation of only one 
industry and derived from annual reports as the only source.  Thus it is too restricted to 
generalise.   
 
The potential limitation of the measurement of disclosures is recognised in this paper; as 
a result, an alternative measurement tool, content analysis, is employed.  Content analysis is 
applied to measure the degree and quality of disclosures made in company announcements 
and news releases.  In particular, this method is prevalently employed with narrative 
accounting information (Jones & Shoemaker 1994).  This instrument is considered directly 
applicable to the aims of this paper and so would be useful in facilitating an examination of 
the content of disclosures.    
 
In conclusion, this review of the current literature suggests that there are a number of 
studies relating to analysts’ recommendations and voluntary disclosures.  However, these two    10 
areas are almost always considered separately; the two concepts are rarely explored together.  
There is no study directly examining how the extent or characteristics of disclosures affect the 
changes in analyst recommendations.  As the literature lacks sufficient descriptive work 
providing detailed information in this specific area, there is an opportunity to develop a more 
integrated approach to the study of the decision usefulness of voluntary accounting disclosure.  
This paper therefore undertakes the investigation of whether and how voluntary disclosures 
affect analyst recommendations.   
 
This paper differs from most of the prior studies on voluntary disclosures in three 
important ways.  Firstly, the aspects of voluntary disclosures are treated as independent 
variables rather than being a dependent variable as in studies that investigate determinants of 
voluntary disclosures.  Secondly, voluntary disclosures are examined against analysts’ 
recommendations rather than the properties of analysts’ forecasts.  Thirdly, this paper makes 
an effort to improve on previous research by applying content analysis to examine the content 
of information disclosures from both internal and external sources that might affect changes in 
analyst recommendations.  It is expected that the changes in analyst recommendations may be 
a significant surrogate for the measurement of the informativeness of corporate disclosure and 
that results derived from this paper would then significantly extend the knowledge gained and 
augment the existing voluntary disclosure studies.   
 
2.2   Hypothesis Development 
 
Relevant prior studies are Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Walker and Tsalta (2001).  
Both empirically investigate the association between corporate disclosures and analyst 
behaviour.  Specifically, they examine whether the extent of voluntary information 
disclosures affects the number of analysts following firms, the number of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, and properties of earnings forecasts.  While neither study investigates the 
relationship between voluntary disclosures and analyst recommendation revisions, the concept 
of an expected association between disclosures and properties of earnings forecasts is 
applicable to the scope of analyst recommendations in this study.  This is because both 
earnings forecasts and analyst recommendations are the output of the analysts’ decision-
making process.     11 
The broad research problem of this study concerns how characteristics of voluntary 
disclosures are associated with analysts’ recommendation revisions and the extent of that 
association.  This study captures evidence to draw conclusions on the impact of voluntary 
disclosures on the changes in analysts’ recommendation.  The decision usefulness of 
voluntary accounting disclosures made by companies is to be reflected by the analysts’ use of 
such information items to reach conclusions in their analysis and in making stock 
recommendations.   
 
This study proposes a model in which a change or revision of investment analysts’ 
recommendations for firms is a function of firms’ voluntary information disclosures.  The 
relationship between the extent of accounting disclosures and the outcome of analysts’ work 
has been established in that the dependent variable is the revisions or changes of analyst 
recommendations and its variance is to be reflected by the variation in corporate voluntary 
disclosures.   
 
The proposition above leads to the formulation of a basic hypothesis, expressed in the 
null form: 
 
Ho:  There is no relationship between analyst recommendation changes and the 
characteristics of voluntary disclosures. 
 
The characteristics of analyst recommendation revisions are investigated to determine any 
association with the extent of voluntary disclosure.  The characteristics of recommendation 
revisions are observed in two different manners, i.e., quantity and attributes of revisions.  
Similarly, the extent and nature of voluntary disclosures involves both quantity and quality 
aspects, which are represented by separate measurements of disclosures in announcements 
and news.   
 
Meanwhile, the relationship between the characteristics of the analyst recommendation 
revisions and the extent of voluntary disclosures as proposed are based on the assumption that 
all other factors remain unchanged or are held constant.  However, other variables (e.g., 
behavioural factors) may account for variations in analyst recommendation revisions, and 
may change and affect such a relationship.  This study, based on existing literature, takes    12 
account of two other variables that can possibly affect the recommendation revision including 
company size and industry type.   
 
Company size has consistently been found to be significantly and positively associated 
with disclosures in several prior studies (e.g., Meek et al. 1995; Ahmed & Courtis 1999; Robb 
et al. 2001).  Company size has also been evidenced to be a determinant of analyst following 
activity, i.e., large firms are more heavily followed by analysts (Bhushan 1989).  Information 
about larger companies may be of interest to more investors than information about smaller 
companies.  Consequently, analysts are more likely to monitor larger companies so that they 
can advise investors on the prospects of the company.  Hence larger companies may increase 
their disclosures, enabling analysts to enhance their analysis and revise the recommendations 
on that company.  Similarly, type of industry might influence the extent of disclosure and 
hence the number of analysts'  recommendation revisions.  Meek et al. (1995) and Robb et al. 
(2001) find that type of industry appears to be influential in the variations in disclosures.  
More specifically, Cooke (1989, 1991 and 1992) finds that manufacturing companies disclose 
more information than non-manufacturing firms.  O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) evidence a 
link between industry characteristics and analyst following activity.  In general, there is 
evidence that industry type is related to the extent of disclosures as well as the degree of 
analyst following; as such industry type is included as another control variable to be tested in 
this paper.   
 
In all, these arguments allow for the formulation of a number of subsidiary hypotheses 
for testing.  The first two hypotheses are related to the number of recommendation revisions 
and quantitative characteristics of voluntary disclosures.  It is expected that increased 
disclosure leads to an increase in the number of recommendation revisions.  This is because 
the greater the volume of voluntary disclosures, the higher the probability that the disclosures 
are decision-useful, facilitating a change or revision of analyst recommendations.  The 
quantitative characteristics of disclosures are assessed by two components: the number of 
sentences in announcements and the number of sentences in news items.  Thus for each 
component, the following hypotheses can be developed and presented in the null form: 
 
Ho1:  There is no relationship between the number of analyst recommendation changes 
and total number of sentences in announcements.     13 
Ho2:  There is no relationship between the number of analyst recommendation changes 
and total number of sentences in news items. 
 
The possible influence of company size or industry type to the number of analyst 
recommendation changes is considered and tested with the following two additional 
hypotheses, expressed in the null form: 
 
Ho3:  There is no relationship between the number of analyst recommendation changes 
and company size. 
 
Ho4:  There is no relationship between the number of analyst recommendation changes 
and industry type. 
 
Apart from observing the number of recommendation revisions, further hypotheses postulate 
an association between the attributes of recommendation changes and the qualitative 
characteristics of disclosures.  The differing sources or proxies for disclosures dictate the 
separate hypotheses.  The expectation is that the different types of information carry different 
levels of importance, thus having a variable impact on the analyst’s decision process in 
revising recommendations.  The relevant null hypotheses are: 
 
Ho5:  There is no relationship between attributes of analyst recommendation changes 
and qualitative characteristics of disclosures from announcements. 
 
Ho6:  There is no relationship between attributes of analyst recommendation changes 
and qualitative characteristics of disclosures from news items. 
 
The existence of company size and industry type can possibly be investigated with the 
attributes of analyst recommendation changes.  As a result, two additional null hypotheses are 
formulated: 
 
Ho7:  There is no relationship between attributes of analyst recommendation changes 
and company size.     14 
Ho8:  There is no relationship between attributes of analyst recommendation changes 
and industry type. 
 
3.   Research Method 
 
3.1   Sample Selection 
 
The population for sampling is that of listed Australian companies, which constitute the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) All Ordinaries Index 500
2 as of March 2003.  The reason 
for choosing firms in the top 500 is because there is a high probability that the data required 
(recommendation revisions, company announcement, and news) for such large businesses 
would be frequent and readily available for analysis.  On this basis, the sample is biased 
towards large capitalisation firms. 
 
There are restrictions on sample selection criteria due to the availability of related data 
of interest in this study.  Specifically, firms are included in the final sample on the basis that: 
 
a.  A firm is not in an industry that is highly regulated (for example, banking, insurance, 
securities, and utilities) or specialised (for example, mining, construction, real estate and 
certain types of transportation).  The remaining industries would then represent a cross-
section of firms from relatively homogeneous manufacturing-related and service-related 
(services, wholesale, and retail) industries.  This is because regulated and specialised 
industries have a distinctive nature and hence firms in such industries operate in a 
different disclosure environment from manufacturing and/or service firms (Hossain & 
Adams 1995); 
b.  A firm is covered in the I/B/E/S recommendation history database and there must be a 
match of at least one analyst recommendation revision during the period of 1998-1999 
in this database; and 
c.  A firm has to be accessible through the ASX database; it must be currently active, not 
delisted, and its company name or ASX code must not have changed after 1998, since  
the ASX database offers information only on companies with a current name and ASX 
code.    15 
The selection of sample firms is performed as follows.  As of March 2003, there are 498 
companies in the ASX All Ordinaries Index.  The first criterion (excluding sectors) reduces 
the sample size by 260 companies.  For the second criterion, the remaining 238 are checked 
against the I/B/E/S Ticker Code table to see initially whether the company is covered by 
I/B/E/S.  Sixty-one companies are eliminated because they do not have an accompanying 
I/B/E/S Ticker Code; a further fifty-one companies are missing details for years 1998-1999.  
Further, even though the company has the recommendation data in I/B/E/S, it needs to meet 
the third criterion of having company announcements being accessible through the ASX 
database; a further fifteen companies fail this criterion through delisting or changed codes , 
leaving  only 110 companies which meet all three of the above criteria.   
A sample of 40 companies is drawn the eligible 110 by stratified random sampling. The 
sample represents 14 industry groups of 7 GICS (General Industry Classification Scheme) 
sectors inclusively.  Table 1 shows the distribution of the final sample companies by sector 
and industry group. 
 
Table 1:  Distribution of Sample Firms across Sectors and Industries 
 
Sector 
(Industry classification scheme) 
Number of 
Companies    Industry group  Number of 
Companies 
1. Consumer Discretionary  9  1. Automobile & Components*  2 
    2. Consumer Durables & Apparel*  1 
    3. Hotels Restaurants & Leisure  3 
    4. Retailing  3 
2. Consumer Staples  5  5. Food & Staples Retailing  1 
    6. Food Beverage & Tobacco*  4 
3. Health Care  9  7. Health Care Equipment & Services*  5 
    8. Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology  4 
4. Industrials  10  9. Capital Goods*  5 
    10. Commercial Services & Supplies  5 
5. Information Technology  2  11. Software & Services  1 
    12. Technology Hardware & Equipment*  1 
6. Materials  4  13. Materials*  4 
7. Telecommunication Services  1  14. Telecommunication Services  1 
  40    40 
* 22 companies are from industries defined as being  “manufacturing”. 
 
3.2   Data 
 
Analyst recommendations used in this paper are a single-word rating/recommendation, 
i.e., buy, hold, or sell.  Data relevant to analyst recommendations are extracted from the 
I/B/E/S International Detail Recommendation History CD-ROM.  Proxies for voluntary 
disclosures include both internal and external sources of information.  The internal disclosure 
information made directly from a company consists of company announcements made     16 
publicly through the company announcement platform.  These announcements are retrieved 
directly from the ASX website.  The external source disclosure is information from the 
company-related news reported in the newspapers.  Company-related news items are collected 
from the LexisNexis® database, which covers most major Australian newspapers. 
   
Company announcements are continuous disclosures made directly by a company.  
These announcements are posted through the company announcement platform hosted by the 
ASX.  Listed Australian companies are required to make public disclosures through the ASX 
platform (Listing Rule 3.1 ASX 2003b) and the disclosure contents are deemed voluntary 
following the interpretation of the ASX Guidance Note and the arguments in Brown et al. 
(1999, p. 140). The Guidance Note 8 on Continuous Disclosure to accompany Listing Rule 
3.1 (ASX 2003a) states that the obligation to make disclosures (referred to as company 
announcements) is based solely on the entity’s justification but must be in accordance with 
the Rule and best practice.  Meanwhile, Brown et al. (1999, p. 140) argue that the company’s 
discretion to determine whether or not to disclose certain information enables this form of 
disclosures to be regarded as voluntary.
3  The company announcements encompass several 
matters, for example, half yearly reports of results, preliminary final reports or results, 
directors’ interests, and changes in substantial shareholding. 
 
Company-related news in the media is also included in this study as a proxy for 
voluntary disclosures so as to enhance the richness of the dataset.  It is customary that 
announcements by companies or announcements of public interest are usually reported in the 
news reports by the media.  Therefore, the same item of company information may be covered 
by both sources at any given time.  However, frequently business news in the media might not 
be sourced directly from the company; the media themselves may generate original news 
items, for example, in cover stories, reviews, or comments on company activity.  From this 
point of view, the additional benefit of adding the media source into this study is evident as 
the media offer supplementary information regarding the company.  
 
Data collection processes are performed step by step.  First, the recommendation 
revisions for each of the 40 sample companies are tracked.  The duration between the two 
recommendations (the old and new recommendations) is identified.  This interval is later used 
as a search period for company voluntary disclosures.  Second, announcements and news 
items are located by company and over the time period when the recommendation changes    17 
occurred.  Finally, the recommendation revisions are matched with the presence of voluntary 
disclosures during the change period. 
 
The sample of 40 companies yields 267 recommendation revisions over the two-year 
period of 1998-1999.  Regarding the amount of disclosures, there are respectively 2,149 and 
4,186 items of announcements and news collected.  Separately, all announcement items 
produce 30,287 sentences and all news items produce 36,632 sentences 
 
3.3   Measurement of Analyst recommendation changes (Dependent variable) 
 
The focus of attention is on the revision or change of a recommendation.  In particular, 
the selection criteria are that there must be at least a pair of consecutive recommendations 
issued by the same analyst in the same brokerage company, and the new rating or following 
recommendation must be a revised rating not a reiterated one.  Also, in order to limit the 
duration of the time period between events, the time between these two consecutive 
recommendations must not exceed 12 months.  The time period between the two 
recommendations is noted by recording the issue date of each recommendation. 
 
Recommendation changes are recorded in two different manners.  Separate analysis is 
performed for each of the following: 
 
(1)   Direction of recommendation change 
This measure classifies recommendation revisions into two main groups according to 
the direction of change: upgrade and downgrade. 
 
(2)   Type of new recommendation 
The second measure is referred to as the rating to which the revision is designated, i.e., 
whether the revision is “buy” or “non-buy”.  This classification is justified on the grounds of 
prior research (e.g., Francis & Soffer 1997) which indicates that “buy” is the most influential 
recommendation rating in terms of its value to investors.  Analysts rarely issue “sell” 
recommendation; they are optimistically biased towards the issuing of favourable stock 
recommendation, i.e., a “buy” rating (Womack 1996).  Bradshaw (2002, 2004) further notes 
that the market appears to interpret “hold” recommendations as essentially “sell” 
recommendations.  In the context of this study, the “buy” and “non-buy” categories can be    18 
determined by transforming the original I/B/E/S five-level rating.
4  The “buy” group includes 
strong buy and buy; anything else other than buy, i.e., hold, underperform, and sell, are 
classified as “non-buy”.  
 
3.4   Methodology and Measurement of Voluntary Disclosures (Independent Variable) 
 
3.4.1  Content Analysis 
 
Content analysis is a set of procedures for collecting and organising information in a 
standardised format that allows researchers to make or draw inferences about the 
characteristics and meaning of written and other recorded material.  Holsti (1969, p. 14) 
defines content analysis as “any technique for making inferences by objectively and 
systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages”.  Krippendorff (1980, p. 21) 
adds that content analysis involves specialised procedures for “making replicable and valid 
inferences from data to their context”.  In making such valid inferences, content analysis as a 
research method utilises a set of procedures to compress many words of text into fewer 
content categories based on explicit rules of coding (Weber 1990).  Weber (1990) states that 
the content analysis method enables researchers to combine both qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of texts.   
 
Jones and Shoemaker (1994) state that the content analysis method was first used within 
non-accounting areas but it is now widely used by accounting researchers.  In their survey of 
accounting narrative studies, Jones and Shoemaker (1994) identify two types of content 
analysis method in accounting areas: thematic and syntactic studies.  Thematic studies extract 
and analyse themes
5 inherent within the narratives and draw inferences from those texts.  
Syntactic studies aim to analyse the readability and understandability of the narrative content.   
 
In another view, Smith and Taffler (2000) and Uang et al. (2001) use two alternative 
generic approaches of content analysis: form-oriented (objective) analysis and meaning-
oriented (subjective) analysis.  The routine counting of points, words, sentences, lines, 
concrete references, or paragraphs can be performed in word-based form oriented analysis 
whereas the analysis of the underlying themes in the texts under investigation is the focus of 
meaning-oriented analysis.  The form-oriented (word-based) approach is a more direct 
measure and more reliable in terms of the coding process.  Empirically, it is noted that word-    19 
based content analysis is subject to the assumption that frequency of word occurrence directly 
reflects the degree of emphasis (Smith & Taffler 2000; Uang et al. 2001). 
 
Accounting narratives, such as company messages or disclosures, have been widely 
analysed using content analysis.  Mostly, this has been to investigate the characteristics and/or 
value of information contained in the message.  For example, content analysis has been 
mainly applied to examine narrative information contained in the chairman/president’s letter 
and management discussion and analysis (MD&A) of firms’ operations (e.g., Ingram & 
Frazier 1983; Frazier et al. 1984; Tennyson, Ingram & Dugan 1990; Abrahamson & Amir 
1996; Bryan 1997, Smith & Taffler 2000; Uang et al. 2001).  The messages of such 
disclosures are content analysed according to the “explicit rules” that researchers have made 
clear prior to analysis.  In brief, narratives are coded and grouped into predefined and 
meaningful categories.  Variables such as frequency of words, paragraphs, or themes are 
derived after all texts are completely coded.  In the end, such variables can be examined with 
other variables of interest to draw inferences from the content of the information. 
 
Content analysis is also used to gain an understanding of the decision process of the 
author of the messages.  For example, the content of analyst research reports can be analysed 
to explore the importance of company financial reporting to analysts, how analysts process 
such information, and how analysts use financial/accounting information in analysing stocks 
(e.g., Previts et al. 1994; Rogers & Grant 1997; Breton & Taffler 2001).  Following the 
content analysis procedure, the texts in analyst reports are scanned and grouped into the 
researcher’s defined categories.  Variables are obtained such as frequencies of words or 
counts within categories.  Later, those variables are further analysed using statistical tools and 
the inferences of the content of messages can be drawn from the process. 
 
It is appropriate to use the content analysis method in this paper since it is unobtrusive, 
there being no need to study or directly contact the subjects (companies or analysts).  Content 
analysis provides a method for converting the narrative format of disclosures into a 
quantitative measure that can be statistically related to other variables in the study.  In this 
paper content analysis is used in identifying content categories from voluntary disclosure 
messages and examining the patterns or intentions of the messages.  Statistical analysis 
facilitates an examination of the nature of the relationship between voluntary disclosure 
content and analyst recommendation changes.     20 
3.4.2  Measurement of Voluntary disclosures (Independent variable) 
 
The requirement for collecting company announcements and news items, as stated, is to 
select those voluntary disclosures made during the time period of the recommendation 
changes.  The analyses of announcement and news items are performed separately but 
processed with the same method of content analysis.  Procedures to conduct content analysis 
for these items are described as follows: 
 
Step 1: Determine the Sample Units (Material Analysed) 
 
Company announcements and news documents are the texts to be examined.  These 
documents are scoped to be only those issued or announced during the period of 
recommendation changes.  Announcements within a specified period are all valid for analysis, 
but news items need some preliminary scanning.  The company name is used as a keyword 
search in the newspaper database.  As a result, every news item containing the company name 
is retrieved.  In most cases, a news item superficially relevant to the company could be 
excluded, for example, a news item just mentioning the company name but containing no 
material content or related activity of that company. 
 
Step 2: Select the Unit of Analysis 
 
The unit of analysis is the sentence and an analysis based on a meaning-oriented 
approach is undertaken.
6  Each sentence in a document is read to find out the keyword or 
theme that conveys specific meaning enabling the determination and classification of the 
sentence into an event category (to be discussed in the next step).  Coding on sentences is 
appropriate because the conflict of messages within paragraphs and the problem of having 
paragraphs of wildly varying size can be avoided.  Milne and Adler (1999, p. 243) provide the 
supporting comment as to the unit of analysis that “as a basis for coding, sentences are far 
more reliable than any other unit of analysis”. 
 
Step 3: Define the Categories 
 
There are three classification schemes or categories used for coding a sentence read 
from announcements and news items.  They are (1) theme category, (2) signal category and,    21 
(3) price-sensitivity category.  The three categories are isolated; they are not affiliated with 
one another.  All elements (members of a category) are also mutually exclusive.  The 
advantage is to facilitate the separate quantitative analysis for each set of category in the later 
stage.    
 
For the first classification scheme, the theme category, the classification schemes in 
Meek et al. 1995, Robb et al. 2001, and Beattie et al. 2002 are initially consulted.  The 
categories in these studies are relatively comprehensive; however, they are based solely on 
information items disclosed through annual reports.  Accordingly, these categories cover only 
company self-released information as it appears in annual reports, and do not encompass 
information releases from outside the company, e.g., reviews by analysts or newspapers, 
which are also of interest in this study.   
 
The definitive theme category set is primarily based on the revision of classification 
schemes in prior studies relating to the categorisation of company news releases (Morse 1982; 
Foster 1986; Thompson, Olsen & Dietrich 1987; Brookfield & Morris 1992; Pritamani & 
Singal 2001; Ryan & Taffler 2004).  A final list of the theme category is established; it 
consists of 14 mutually exclusive theme elements (Appendix A).  The list covers all possible 
types of company announcements and news, as well as being easier to sort out themes derived 
from a sentence.  In examining the preliminary reliability of the theme category, the definitive 
theme category list is also verified independently by two senior accounting academics to seek 
the clearest understanding of the category set. 
 
The second scheme, the signal category, is divided into three dimensions, i.e., 
favourable (F), neutral (N), or unfavourable (U).  The third scheme, price-sensitivity, is sorted 
into two events; simply whether the sentence carries price-sensitive information (PS) or not 
(NS).   
 
Step 4: Generate the Coding Scheme 
 
The content analysis of company announcements and news items is performed entirely 
by manual reading and coding, while computer analysis is used principally to collect 
frequency data.  The complexity of wording in announcements, and especially in news items, 
is normally beyond the settings of a computer program, so a human coding method is    22 
preferred to the use of computer coding.  Obviously, the coding here relies on human decision 
processes, for example, there is additional judgement required when deciding on contexts 
(around the keyword) in the sentence.  Whilst human coding may require extensive time and 
effort, reliability is believed to be dependable.  With the concern over the reliability issue, a 
control to reduce the arbitrariness is set.  Two independent academics reviewed the scheme 
and took part in the coding process.  This is to confirm the validity and reliability of the entire 
coding method applied by human coding in this study.  This matter is discussed more in the 
next step. 
 
Company announcements and news items are analysed one by one.  The term “item” is 
used to refer to one announcement or news item extracted from the associated database.  For 
each single item, the coding scheme includes: 
 
a.  reading sentence by sentence, 
b.  identifying an event or dimension of each category (theme, signal, and price-sensitivity) 
from the meaning or topic discussed in the sentence, 
c.  assigning an appropriate event code (theme, signal, and price-sensitivity) for that 
sentence, and 
d.  recording one count of the sentence to each event of that category being assigned. 
 
These steps are repeatedly performed for every sentence in the document and for every item 
of the same time period to classify the theme of each sentence into one of the dimensions of 
the theme category; the definition of each theme is used as criteria for making the decision.  
Based on the understanding of the theme description, the coder then decides which theme is to 
be assigned to that sentence.   
 
Sentence by sentence reading helps to avoid possible bias from selective categorising, 
especially when there is a long paragraph or document.  In most cases, the classification of 
information is self-explanatory, e.g., it contains a word or group of words being simply 
referred to in the definition of any theme.  For example, the release of a preliminary final 
report usually discusses annual profits, allowing it to be sorted into the theme of “earnings-
related”.     23 
For the determination of signals, each sentence is coded according to its conveyed 
signals as favourable (F), neutral (N), or unfavourable (U).  In order to decide either signal (F, 
N, or U) for the theme in the sentence, the meaning of a whole sentence is considered.  For 
each sentence, labels are assigned corresponding to the sense of content that the disclosure 
might represent – “good news”, “neutral”, or “bad news”.  The rule is that the sentence is 
labelled as “favourable” if it might have a positive effect (good news) on earnings; as 
“unfavourable” if it might have a negative effect (bad news) on earnings; and as “neutral” if 
no effect on earnings is likely.  Practically, a single word in a sentence such as “profit” or 
“loss” (that most likely indicates the clear message of the whole sentence) is scanned first.  
Simply put, the keyword with optimistic or positive meaning such as “profitable” is treated as 
“favourable”, while “loss” is “unfavourable.  However, a phrase or context would be very 
much critical in deciding a proper judgment for a confused set of words like “reduced profit” 
or “reduced loss”. 
 
Finally, a sentence is flagged as to whether it is price-sensitive information (PS) or non 
price-sensitive (NS).  This determination is in accordance with the judgment of the ASX.
7  
Normally, the ASX would label an announcement as price-sensitive when information 
contained in that announcement is considered to have a material effect on company stock 
prices.  For the purpose of this study, all sentences in a price-sensitive announcement are 
assigned a price-sensitive flag according to the ASX judgement.   
 
The classification of price-sensitiveness (for announcements) is also assumed to apply 
to news items.  The rule is simply that the news discussing the same contents as those of 
price-sensitive announcements is flagged as price-sensitive as well.  By this means, any 
sentences of news items on the same content of price-sensitive announcements are treated as 
being price-sensitive.  It is noted that news items are usually disclosed on or just a few days 
following the date of company announcements, but there are many cases that the same news 
content appears to be repeatedly reported several days later.  In this case, only fresh news 
after the price-sensitive announcement is considered price-sensitive. 
 
Following the design of the category sets noted in the previous step, one of the coding 
rules adopted is to specify that any sentence be assigned to only one element or event in a 
given category, the one where it fits best.  All three classification schemes are independent 
from one another and the coding to each element in a category is not conditional upon any     24 
other events and categories.
8  All coding rules are strictly followed for the coding of every 
sentence from announcements and news items of the dataset.  Appendix B illustrates how the 
announcements and news items are coded.  The use of a coding scheme can be verified by 
employing more than one coder to perform the coding and check the agreement of the coding 
results.  The next step reports on the reliability tests and results. 
 
Step 5: Assess Validity and Reliability  
 
The validity of assigning disclosures to any events of the three categories is initially 
secured by ensuring that the content analysis in this study employs well-specified decision 
categories with well-specified decision rules.  Later, the inter-coder reliability is also observed 
to confirm the level of agreement among the three coders. 
 
The validity and reliability of the category set, especially the theme category, is 
considered first.  Two academics, as noted above, initially verify the final theme category list.  
This is to see if the modified or added themes and its accompanying definition are clearly 
understood by persons other than the one who actually revises the category list.  After the 
theme category is settled, these academics perform the reading and coding on a small subset 
of announcements and news items so as to ensure the level of validity and reliability of the 
coding process. 
 
The reliability of the coding process itself also needs to be estimated to ensure accurate 
and unbiased classification of sentences in items to categories.  Four reliability measures, i.e., 
“Percent agreement”, “Scott’s pi (p)”, “Cohen’s kappa (k)”, and “Krippendorff”s alpha (a)”, 
are calculated to express the extent of agreement achieved among coders regarding the 
assignment of a sentence to an event of the theme and signal categories.  Table 2 shows the 
measures derived from the four different reliability measures. 
 
Table 2:  The Levels of Inter-Coder Reliability 
  
Reliability measures  Results 
Percent agreement  91% 
Scott’s pi (p)  88% 
Cohen’s kappa (k)  89% 
Krippendorff”s alpha (a)  83%     25 
Wimmer and Dominick (2003) state that there is no universally acceptable level of 
reliability to apply to every research context but they suggest 0.75 or above when using pi or 
alpha (2003, p. 158-159).  Boyatzis (1998, p. 156) suggests the acceptable level for percent 
agreement is typically 70% or better.  In several surveys discussing the reliability of the 
measurement of corporate social disclosures, Guthrie and Mathews (1985), Hackston and 
Milne (1996) and Milne and Adler (1999) all generally recommend the agreement of over 
0.80.  Neuendorf (2002, p. 143) proposes, based on the review of prior work, that a reliability 
coefficient of 0.90 or greater would be acceptable to all, and 0.80 or greater would be 
acceptable in most situations.  According to these points of reference, the level of agreement 
achieved here is therefore highly satisfactory.   
 
Step 6: Define the Quantification Levels for Coded Data 
 
For all coded sentences, the aggregation method is to count the sentences.  Primarily, it 
is easy to perform as the coding is done based on the reading of each sentence.  Milne and 
Adler (1999, p. 243) state that using sentences for both coding and measurement seems likely 
to provide complete, reliable, and meaningful data for further analysis.  In addition, counting 
sentences is adopted according to assumptions based on the principle of content analysis, in 
that repetition of a theme/category is equated to the importance weighting for that 
theme/category.  According to Weber (1990, p. 56), “counting [category frequency] assumes 
that higher relative counts (proportion, percentage, or ranks) reflect higher concern with [that] 
category”.  As a result, the frequency, or here the sentence counts by category, reflects the 
degree of emphasis of that category. 
 
The data is coded and quantified for each individual time period.  For each time period, 
the frequency of each event in the category (event counts) is aggregated.  Event counts are 
obtained by adding up the number of sentences recorded for the same event.  Each event of 
the three isolated set of categories (theme, signal and price-sensitivity) is totalled separately, 
i.e., there is an individual sum of each event of the theme, signal, and price-sensitivity 
categories.  
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3.5   Other Variables 
 
Two other variables, i.e., company size and industry type, are included in the analysis of 
the impact on recommendation revision.  Company size is measured by the natural logarithm 
of total sales (average total sales of 1998-1999).
9  The industry type is represented by the type 
of industry in which a firm operates.  Industry type, divided into two groups, is measured by 
denoting whether the company is a manufacturing or non-manufacturing company based on 
the industry classification group used by the stock exchange (refer to Table 1).  Initially, the 
industry group was to be used as the measure of industry characteristics.  However, the 
segregation of only 40 sample companies into specific industry groups leads to a very uneven 
distribution or too few numbers of companies and number of recommendation revisions for 
some industry groups.  This would have caused statistical problems (e.g., too few instances or 
very unequal sub-samples).  The broad grouping (2 categories) is thus used instead. 
 
3.6   Statistical Tests and Empirical Models 
 
The hypotheses are examined by conducting a correlation analysis and a regression 
analysis of the properties of recommendation revisions on the extent of voluntary disclosures.  
The hypotheses stated earlier are tested with the following general empirical models: 
 
Based on the hypotheses, three models are developed.  These models are tested 
separately for the disclosure data of company announcements and news items.  The 
specifications are as follows:  
 
a.  Number of recommendation changes and the amount of voluntary disclosures 
Number of recommendation revisions = f (the amount of voluntary disclosures|control 
variables) 
b.  The direction of change and the characteristics of voluntary disclosures 
Direction of change = f (the characteristics of voluntary disclosures|control variables); 
where DIR = 1 for upward revision; 0 for downward revision 
c.  The type of new recommendation and the characteristics of voluntary disclosures 
Type of new recommendation = f (the characteristics of voluntary disclosures|control 
variables); where RECTYPE = 1 if new recommendation is buy; 0 otherwise (non-buy)      27 
4.  Results and Discussion 
 
4.1   Characteristics of Recommendation Changes 
 
Table 3 shows the grouping of recommendation changes by industry type (whether the 
industry/firm is a manufacturing company.  As can be seen, the number of manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing firms is almost evenly distributed in this sample as is the number of 
recommendation changes recorded for each. 
 
Table 3:  Recommendation Changes by Industry Type (Manufacturing or Not) 
 
Number of recommendation changes  Industry Type  Number of 
companies  Upgrade  Downgrade  Total  Percentage 
Manufacturing firm  22  65  69  134  50.19 
Non-manufacturing firm  18  72  61  133  49.81 
Total  40  137  130  267  100.00 
 
Table 4 presents the matrix of 267 recommendation changes.  About 48 percent of the 
recommendations are buys (Strong Buy and Buy), 43 percent are holds, and only 9 percent are 
sells (Underperform and Sell).  The ratio of new buys to new sells here is 5.3:1 which is 
similar to those reported elsewhere.
10  The low number of “sell” revisions (i.e., 6, being 2.2%) 
supports the findings of the prior literature, that analysts are less likely to issue sell 
recommendations. 
 
Table 4:  The Matrix of Recommendation Changes* 
 
  To (New Rating) 
  1 Strong 
Buy 
2 Buy  3 Hold  4 Under 
perform 
5 Sell  Total 
From (Old Rating)             
1 Strong Buy  -  17  58  1  2  78 
    (6.4%)  (21.7%)  (0.4%)  (0.7%)  (29.2%) 
2 Buy  19    31  5  -  55 
  (7.1%)    (11.6%)  (1.9%)    (20.6%) 
3 Hold  52  32    12  3  99 
  (19.5%)  (12.0%)    (4.5%)  (1.1%)  (37.1%) 
4 Underperform  2  3  18    1  24 
  (0.7%)  (1.1%)  (6.7%)    (0.4%)  (9.0%) 
5 Sell  1  1  9  -    11 
  (0.4%)  (0.4%)  (3.4%)      (4.1%) 
Total  74  53  116  18  6  267 
  (27.7%)  (19.9%)  (43.4%)  (6.7%)  (2.2%)  (100.0%) 
* The rating follows the I/B/E/S Recommendation Scale.      28 
Table 5 shows the available sample of revisions for each measure of recommendation 
changes.  Out of 267 total revisions, there are 9 change periods having no announcements and 
12 periods with no news items.  As a result, samples of recommendation revisions are slightly 
adjusted according to the availability of data relevant to the analysis of each measure 
(attribute of revision).   
 
Table 5:  Recommendation Changes (Number of Change Periods), Classified by Types of 
Revisions, Available to Corresponding Disclosures 
 
Number of cases matched to each measurement of disclosures (n)  Measure of 
recommendation 
changes 
Content analysis of announcements  Content analysis of news items 
1. Direction  258  255 
Upgrade  133  128 
Downgrade  125  127 
     
2. Type of rating  258  255 
Buy  123  119 
Non-buy  135  136 
 
 
4.2   Descriptive Evidence  
 
4.2.1 Volume of Disclosures from Announcements and News 
 
The descriptive statistics of the volume of disclosures from announcements and 
coverage by the media are reported in Table 6.  These figures are aggregated over all 40 
companies.  In terms of volume of items and total sentences disclosed, the media discloses 
more company information than does the company directly via its announcements.  On the 
signal basis, companies prefer to disclose neutral messages while the media divides almost 
equally between favourable and neutral messages.  Obviously, unfavourable messages are the 
least common disclosures in both sources.  With respect to the sensitivity category, non price-
sensitive information is far more prevalent than price-sensitive information in these two 
sources. 
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Table 6:  Descriptive Statistics of Volume of Disclosures by Source and by Category 
 
  Mean numbers 
  announcements  news items 
Number of items  53.73  104.65 
Number of total sentences  757.18  915.80 
By signal category:     
No. of favourable sentences  290.08  343.93 
No. of neutral sentences  411.10  383.68 
No. of unfavourable sentences  56.00  188.20 
By sensitivity category:     
No. of price-sensitive sentences  281.28  295.70 
No. of non price-sensitive sentences  475.90  620.10 
 
 
4.2.2  Disclosures from Announcements 
 
The characteristics of the disclosure measures from the announcements are presented in 
Table 7.  It reports the number of sentences and proportions of the amount of disclosures as 
measured by the number of sentences classified by signal, price-sensitivity, and theme.  In 
addition, it also reports the descriptive statistics including the mean value of all variables 
recorded from the content analysis of announcements. 
 
Regarding the signal of disclosures, more than 50 percent of company disclosures 
(announcements) are classified as “neutral”.  It is not surprising that the “unfavourable 
disclosures” are the smallest component of disclosures from a company; these accounted for 
only 8.54 percent of all disclosures whereas the “favourable messages” reach almost 40 
percent.  This is in agreement with the claim that information provided directly from a 
company is often “superficial and one-sided”, i.e., it did not provide sufficient insights and 
focused too much on positive events (AICPA 1994, Chapter 3). 
 
The “price-sensitivity” aspect of disclosures accounts for only 37.31% of all disclosures, 
so the great majority of disclosures via announcements are “non price-sensitive”. These 
findings are consistent with the suggestion made by Brown et al. (1999) that much of the 
disclosed information is not value relevant. 
 
The thematic categories of the disclosures are sorted in a descending order of 
percentage to all disclosures.  Earnings related disclosures (“earnings and results”) are the 
most prevalent theme of disclosures from company announcements with 26.71%.  The next 
three frequent themes are “management” (16.23%), “financing/capital structure” (15.50%),    30 
and “others” (13.60%).  The distribution of themes is highly skewed, with the top four themes 
accounting for more than 70% of disclosures from announcements. 
 
Table 7:  Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics of Announcement Disclosure Variables 
 
Theme  Number of sentences  % of all sentences  Mean sentence counts 
Signal       
Favourable (F)         19,108            38.34            74.06  
Neutral (N)         26,472            53.12          102.60  
Unfavourable (U)           4,254              8.54            16.49  
Sensitivity       
Price-sensitive (PS)          18,593            37.31            72.07  
Non price-sensitive (NS)          31,241            62.69          121.09  
Theme       
Earnings and results  13,312  26.71  51.60 
Management  8,088  16.23  31.35 
Financing/capital structure  7,724  15.50  29.94 
Others  6,778  13.60  26.27 
Asset changes  3,305  6.63  12.81 
Product  3,046  6.11  11.81 
Outlook  2,527  5.07  9.79 
Labour issues  1,826  3.66  7.08 
Investment/restructuring  1,804  3.62  6.99 
Dividend  662  1.33  2.57 
Securities  640  1.28  2.48 
Government/legal issues  88  0.18  0.34 
Analysts  25  0.05  0.10 
Reviews  9  0.02  0.03 
 
 
4.2.3    Disclosures from News 
 
Table 8 presents the classification, characteristics and descriptive statistics of variables 
for news in a similar manner to the announcements. 
 
From the disclosure in news reports, “unfavourable disclosures” are the smallest 
component of disclosures; this parallels disclosure levels in announcements.  Yet the 
proportion of “unfavourable disclosures” of news, about 22%, is not as small as in 
announcements.  The “favourable” and “neutral” signals of disclosures from the news reports 
are almost equal, but with “favourable” content the most outstanding signal. 
 
The observation on the “price-sensitivity” aspect reveals that contents for news exceed 
those for “non price-sensitive” information, which is in the same direction as disclosure in 
announcements. “Price-sensitive” disclosures account for 33.9% of disclosures in news 
reports.       31 
For thematic variables, as with announcements, “earnings and results” are the most 
prevalent theme of disclosures from news items with 27.32%.  News on “reviews” is also 
another dominant theme, with 23.41% of all disclosures in news.  The distribution of themes 
in news items is again highly skewed, with the top two themes accounting for over half of all 
disclosures in news items. 
 
Table 8:  Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics of News Items Disclosure Variables 
 
Theme  Number of sentences  % of all sentences  Mean sentence counts 
Signal       
Favourable (F)          23,014           39.39            90.25  
Neutral (N)          22,681           38.82            88.95  
Unfavourable (U)          12,733           21.79            49.93  
Sensitivity       
Price-sensitive (PS)          19,810           33.90            77.69  
Non price-sensitive (NS)          38,618           66.10          151.44  
Theme       
Earnings and results  15,964  27.32           62.60  
Reviews  13,679  23.41           53.64  
Asset changes  5,876  10.06           23.04  
Outlook  4,810  8.23           18.86  
Product  4,591  7.86           18.00  
Securities  3,844  6.58           15.07  
Financing/capital structure  1,948  3.33             7.64  
Investment/restructuring  1,865  3.19             7.31  
Analysts  1,548  2.65             6.07  
Management  1,345  2.30             5.27  
Government/legal issues  1,160  1.99             4.55  
Dividend  841  1.44             3.30  
Others  558  0.96             2.19  
Labour issues  399  0.68             1.56  
 
 
4.3   Correlations 
 
4.3.1  Number of recommendation revisions and volume of voluntary disclosures 
 
This section examines the relationship between the number of recommendation 
revisions and (1) volume of voluntary disclosures for the testing of the null hypotheses Ho1 
and Ho2, and (2) control variables (company size and industry type) for testing the null 
hypotheses Ho3 and Ho4.  Table 9 reports the correlation coefficients between each pair of 
variables related to the number of recommendation revisions and the amount of disclosures, 
which suggests a significantly different impact for announcements when compared to news 
items.    32 
 The “number of revisions” is positively correlated with the “total sentences of 
disclosure in company announcements”; showing a correlation coefficient (r) of .555, being 
significant at a 1 percent level.  Further, by observing the number of revision with sentences 
by signal, it shows the “number of revisions” is significantly correlated to all types of signal, 
i.e., the “number of favourable sentences” (r = .280, p-value = .080), the “number of neutral 
sentences” (r = .529, p-value = .000), and the “number of unfavourable sentences” (r = .555, 
p-value = .000).  Finally, the “number of revisions” is significantly correlated with both 
“price-sensitive” (r = .415) and “non price-sensitive” (r = .454) sentence counts at a 1 percent 
level.  The null hypothesis Ho1 ( that there is no relationship between the number of analyst 
recommendation changes and total number of sentences in announcements) must therefore be 
rejected as the relationship between the number of recommendation changes is significantly 
associated with volume of disclosures in company announcements. 
 
On the company news reports in the media, the “number of recommendation revisions” 
is positively correlated to the “total sentences of news items”; with a correlation coefficient 
of .271, significant at the 10 percent level.  By observing sentence counts by classification, the 
“number of favourable sentences” is correlated with the “number of revisions” (r = .359) 
being significant at a 5 percent level.  The “number of unfavourable sentence counts” is 
significantly correlated to the “number of revisions” (r = .362, p-value = .022).  Moreover, the 
“number of revisions” is significantly related to the “price-sensitive sentence counts” (r = .398, 
p-value = .011).  As such, the null hypothesis Ho2 ( that there is no relationship between the 
number of analyst recommendation changes and total number of sentences in news items) 
must be rejected since a significant relationship exists between the number of 
recommendation changes and the volume of disclosures in news reports. 
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Table 9: Correlations between the Number of Revisions and Disclosure 
Characteristics/Control Variables 
 
  Number of Revisions  Company size  Industry Type 
Announcements:       
Number of total sentences  .555 (.000)**  .470 (.002)**  -.013 (.937) 
Favourable sentences  .280 (.080)^     
Neutral sentences  .529 (.000)**     
Unfavourable sentences  .555 (.000)**     
Price-sensitive sentences  .415 (.008)**     
Non price-sensitive sentences  .454 (.003)**     
News:       
Number of total sentences  .271 (.090)^  .202 (.211)  -.096 (.556) 
Favourable sentences  .359 (.023)*     
Neutral sentences  .166 (.306)     
Unfavourable sentences  .362 (.022)*     
Price-sensitive sentences  .398 (.011)*     
Non price-sensitive sentences  .217 (.178)     
Company size   .390 (.013)*     
Industry Type  -.131 (.420)     
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
^ Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
 
Prior empirical evidence has suggested that company size might be an influential 
variable to explain the number of recommendation revisions, and in this case the “number of 
revisions” is positively associated with “company size” (r = .390, p-value = .013) significant 
at the 5 percent level.  As expected, this indicates that larger companies are likely to have a 
higher number of recommendation revisions than smaller firms.  Accordingly, this facilitates 
the rejection of the null hypothesis Ho3 (stating that there is no relationship between the 
number of analyst recommendation changes and company size).  In addition, the correlations 
between company size and the characteristics of disclosures are observed.  There is a 
significant positive relationship between “company size” and the quantity of company 
information disclosures, measured by the “number of total sentences of disclosures in 
company announcements” (r = .470, p-value = .002).  This result is consistent with the 
evidence of previous studies (e.g., Ahmed & Courtis 1999) that large companies tend to 
disclose more information than small companies. 
 
With respect to industry type, the univariate results show that the influence of industry 
type on number of revisions is very weak and not significant for the total number of all 
revisions (r = -.131, p-value = .420).  Accordingly, the null hypothesis Ho4 (that there is no 
relationship between the number of analyst recommendation changes and industry type cannot 
be rejected.  The relationship between industry type and the number of revisions cannot be 
established; implying that industry type is not an indicator of the number of revisions.  The 
test of significance of an association between industry type and the amount of voluntary     34 
disclosures is also observed, and it reveals that the manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
firms are not differentiated in terms of number of sentences disclosed in company 
announcements and news items.   
 
4.3.2  Attributes of recommendation revisions and characteristics of voluntary disclosures 
 
This section reports on an investigation of the relationship between attributes of 
recommendation revisions (rather than the number of revisions in the previous part) and (1) 
the characteristics of disclosure for the testing of the null hypotheses Ho5 and Ho6, and (2) 
company size/industry type for testing the null hypotheses Ho7 and Ho8.   
 
a.  Recommendation Revisions and Disclosures in Announcements 
 
The correlation figures are reported for the relationship between recommendation 
revisions and the frequency variables of announcements.  The correlation matrix reveals 
only a very weak to weak relationship between either “direction of change” or “type of 
new recommendation, and the characteristics of disclosures for company 
announcements.  The most significant relationships are listed here in Table 10: 
 
Table 10: Correlations: Recommendation Revision Attributes and Characteristics of 
Disclosure in Announcements 
 
Measures of recommendation revision  Disclosure variables 
Direction of change  Type of change 
Favourable disclosure  -.105 (.094)*  -.113 (.070)* 
Differences of favourable and unfavourable  -.114 (.069)*  -.116 (.062)* 
Ratio of favourable over unfavourable  -.123 (.077)*  -.119 (.087)* 
Non price-sensitive disclosure  -.078 (.209)  -.103 (.099)* 
Dividend  -.157 (.012)**  -.104 (.095)* 
Product   -.087 (.164)  -.130 (.037)** 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Three variables in Table 10 reveal a favourable signal disclosure (“favourable 
disclosure”, “differences of favourable and unfavourable”, and “ratio of favourable over 
unfavourable”) are found to be significantly negatively associated with both attributes 
of recommendation change at a 10 percent level.  “Non price-sensitive disclosure” is 
significantly associated with “type of change” (r = -.103 significant at a 10 percent 
level).  For thematic features of disclosures, only two out of 14 themes are found to be 
significantly associated with recommendation changes.  Disclosures on “dividend” are     35 
negatively related to “direction of change” (r = -.157, p-value = .012) and “type or 
change (r = -.104, p-value = .095).  Disclosures on “product” information are 
significantly related to “type of change” (r = -.130) at a 5 percent level.  These 
significant associations suggest that the null hypothesis Ho5 ( that there is no 
relationship between recommendation changes and characteristics of disclosures from 
announcements) can be rejected.  It is concluded that there is a relationship between 
recommendation changes and quality of disclosures (in terms of signal, price-sensitivity, 
or themes) from company announcements. 
 
b.  Recommendation Revisions and Disclosures in News 
 
The most significant relationships between recommendation revisions and the frequency 
variables of news items are those listed in Table 11.  The corresponding correlations for 
“news items” are much less significant than those for “announcements”.  The 
correlation matrix reveals that few disclosure variables of news items are found to have 
a very weak association with either “direction of change” and “type of change”. 
 
Table 11:  Correlations: Recommendation Revision Attributes and Characteristics of 
Disclosure in News Items 
 
Measures of recommendation revision  Theme variables 
Direction of change  Type of change 
Differences of favourable and unfavourable  -.109 (.083)*  -.026 (.676) 
Government/legal issues  .066 (.291)  .104 (.097)* 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
On the signal category, the only significant association for “direction of change” 
emerges from the “differences between favourable and unfavourable” news items; this 
displays a correlation coefficient of -.109 significant at the p-value .083 level.  
Remarkably, there is not a single significant relationship between recommendation 
revision and any variables of the classification for price-sensitivity.  Significant 
associations with specific thematic features are also quite rare.  The best correlations are 
only one being significant only at the 10 percent level, which are news about 
“government/legal” issues found to be associated with “type of change” (r = .104, p-
value = .097).  Although the evidence on each qualitative component of disclosure is 
weak, it is sufficient for the null hypothesis Ho6 to be rejected because significant 
relationships between some components in news items and revision attributes are found.     36 
c.  Recommendation Revisions and Control Variables 
 
The univariate analysis between the attributes of recommendation revisions and 
company size/industry type has also been conducted.  In the absence of conventionally 
significant relationships between any measures of recommendation revisions and 
company size/industry type, the null hypothesis Ho7 (that there is no relationship 
between attributes of recommendation changes and company size) and Ho8 (that there is 
no relationship between attributes of recommendation changes and industry type) 
cannot be rejected. 
 
4.3.3  Concluding remarks on correlation analysis 
 
Overall, the univariate results suggest that voluntary disclosures do have an impact on 
the direction and type of analyst recommendation changes, but that it is difficult to pinpoint 
more precise sources of influence.  These univariate test results also indicate the need to 
perform multivariate analysis in order to be able to further refine the findings.  Multivariate 
data analysis combining several independent variables is reported in the next section, with the 
exception that more meaningful relationships may be revealed.  
 
4.4   Regression analysis 
 
The regression analysis focuses only on an examination of the relationship between each 
individual attribute of recommendation revisions and the characteristics of disclosure.  Both 
attributes of recommendation revisions (“direction of change” and “type of change”) are 
measured on a dichotomous scale; as a result the binary logistic regression is applied. 
 
4.4.1  Announcements 
 
The correlations between all independent variables are checked to detect possible 
collinearity between any pair of independent variables.  The correlation matrix (not reported 
here) shows no correlation between independent variables exceeding 0.80.  For 
comprehensive detection, the VIF values of independent variables in both models are 
observed.  There are no variables with a VIF value exceeding 10, suggesting that there no 
significant presence of multicollinearity.      37 
Table 12 shows the estimated coefficients from a logistic regression of “direction of 
change” on all variables.  The model is not significant at the conventional level (p-value 
= .164).  The strength of association measured by the reported pseudo-R
2 is 11.7 percent.  The 
goodness of fit of the model is defined by its predictive value as 64.3 percent.  On a basis of 
individual coefficients, there are three variables with significant coefficient estimations.  
These are “price-sensitive information”, “dividend”, and “financing/capital structure” 
announcement, all being significant at the 5 percent level.  The “difference of price-sensitive 
and non price-sensitive disclosure” as well as “financing/capital structure” announcements, as 
indicated by their positive coefficient, increase the probability of upward revision.  Also 
noteworthy is the negative coefficient of dividend disclosure, which seems to imply that 
increased dividend announcements may reduce the likelihood of upward revision.   
 
Table 12: Estimated Parameters of LOGIT Probability: Direction of Change on 
Announcements (Adjusted Theme Variables) 
 
Dependent variable  Direction of change (DIR)   
Number of observations  258  Pseudo-R square    .117 
-2 Log-likelihood   333.681  Percentage correct predictions:   
Model chi-square  23.735  Downgrade (0)  48.0 
Degrees of freedom  18  Upgrade (1)  79.7 
Significance level  .164  Overall    64.3 
 
  Variable  Coefficient  S.E.  Wald  Sig.  Exp(B)  VIF 
1.Difference of favourable and unfavourable  -0.004  0.005  0.576  0.448  0.996  12.801 
2.Difference of price- and non price-sensitive  0.004  0.002  4.592  * 0.032  1.004  3.923 
3.Earnings and results  0.004  0.006  0.318  0.573  1.004  8.563 
4.Outlook  0.028  0.015  3.385  0.066  1.028  3.790 
5.Dividend  -0.172  0.061  8.084  * 0.004  0.842  1.657 
6.Financing/capital structure  0.007  0.003  4.885  * 0.027  1.007  1.799 
7.Asset changes  -0.001  0.005  0.051  0.821  0.999  1.875 
8.Investment/restructuring  -0.005  0.019  0.075  0.784  0.995  2.975 
9.Product  -0.012  0.007  2.579  0.108  0.988  2.446 
10.Government/legal issues  -0.048  0.100  0.226  0.634  0.953  1.484 
11.Labour issues  0.002  0.008  0.032  0.859  1.002  2.520 
12.Management  0.005  0.005  0.930  0.335  1.005  7.513 
13.Securities  -0.013  0.023  0.312  0.577  0.987  1.429 
14.Analysts  0.317  0.468  0.459  0.498  1.373  1.084 
15.Reviews  0.091  0.487  0.035  0.851  1.096  1.418 
16.Others  0.001  0.005  0.063  0.801  1.001  2.123 
17.Company size  -0.088  0.102  0.751  0.386  0.915  1.360 
18.Industry type = 1  0.176  0.296  0.355  0.551  1.193  1.323 
Constant  1.912  2.049  0.871  0.351  6.769 
 
 
The results of the regression of “type of new recommendation” on announcement 
variables is shown in Table 13.  The model is not significant with the p-value of .300.  The 
strength of relationship is 10.2 percent; while the predictive value of the model is only 58.1 
percent.  On the coefficient estimation, only two of 18 variables are significant at the 5 
percent level in predicting whether the “type of new recommendation” is to be “buy”.  Again,     38 
the “difference between price- and non price-sensitive” emerges as the significant variable 
with a positive coefficient.  “Disclosure on product” is also significant with a negative impact 
on the log odds of revision to “buy”. 
 
Table 13:  Estimated Parameters of LOGIT Probability: Type of New Recommendation on 
Announcements (Adjusted Theme Variables) 
 
Dependent variable  Type of new recommendation (RECTYPE)   
Number of observations  258  Pseudo-R square    .102 
-2 Log-likelihood   336.499  Percentage correct predictions:   
Model chi-square  20.607  Non-buy (0)  51.9 
Degrees of freedom  18  Buy (1)  65.0 
Significance level  .300  Overall    58.1 
 
Variable  Coefficient  S.E.  Wald  Sig.  Exp(B)  VIF
1.Difference of favourable and unfavourable  -0.004  0.005  0.640  0.424  0.996  12.801
2.Difference of price- and non price-sensitive  0.004  0.002  4.692  * 0.030  1.004  3.923
3.Earnings and results  0.006  0.007  0.716  0.397  1.006  8.563
4.Outlook  0.021  0.015  1.874  0.171  1.021  3.790
5.Dividend  -0.103  0.057  3.281  0.070  0.902  1.657
6.Financing/capital structure  0.003  0.002  1.802  0.179  1.003  1.799
7.Asset changes  0.000  0.005  0.008  0.930  1.000  1.875
8.Investment/restructuring  -0.030  0.020  2.390  0.122  0.970  2.975
9.Product  -0.018  0.009  4.478  * 0.034  0.982  2.446
10.Government/legal issues  -0.117  0.112  1.093  0.296  0.890  1.484
11.Labour issues  0.002  0.009  0.031  0.860  1.002  2.520
12.Management  0.006  0.005  1.130  0.288  1.006  7.513
13.Securities  -0.011  0.020  0.293  0.589  0.989  1.429
14.Analysts  0.161  0.263  0.377  0.539  1.175  1.084
15.Reviews  -0.065  0.515  0.016  0.900  0.937  1.418
16.Others  0.008  0.005  2.412  0.120  1.008  2.123
17.Company size  -0.047  0.101  0.218  0.641  0.954  1.360
18.Industry type = 1  0.009  0.297  0.001  0.975  1.009  1.323
Constant  0.980  2.031  0.233  0.630  2.663  
 
 
In  all,  the  results  from  the  multivariate  analysis  on  “announcements”  show  that  the 
variable of “difference between price-sensitive and non price-sensitive” is the outstandingly 
significant  coefficient  of  both  models.    For  themes,  the  significant  ones  are  disclosure 
variables of “dividend”, “financing”, and “product”.  The results here support the rejection of 
the  null  hypothesis  Ho5  (qualitative  characteristics  of  announcements  disclosures  being 
related to the  revision), but the null hypotheses Ho7 and Ho8 cannot be rejected because 
company size and industry type do not have a significant impact on recommendation revisions. 
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4.4.2  News Items 
 
The correlation coefficient matrix (not reported) between the independent variables 
from news items are all well below 0.80, indicating that collinearity among these variables is 
not a problem.  On the more comprehensive VIF measure, no variable has a value above 10, 
diagnostic statistics which suggest that there are no multicollinearity-related problems with 
the regression model, and that the results of the regression can be interpreted with a degree of 
confidence.   
 
Table 14 reports the results of regression on “direction of change”.  The model based on 
news variables is significantly inferior to that for announcements.  The overall model is 
statistically insignificant with the p-value at 0.827.  The strength of association is reported at 
only 6.3 percent whereas the predictive value of the equation is about 58.8 percent.  When all 
18 explanatory variables are entered in the equation, none of them is statistically significant at 
the conventional level of 5 percent.  The variables with the significant value closest to the 
acceptable level appear to be “difference of favourable and unfavourable” and “dividend” 
with the p-value of .123 and .117 respectively.   
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Table 14:  Estimated Parameters of LOGIT Probability: Direction of Change on News Items 
(Adjusted Theme Variables) 
 
Dependent variable  Direction of change (DIR)   
Number of observations  255  Pseudo-R square    .063 
-2 Log-likelihood   341.112  Percentage correct predictions:   
Model chi-square  12.389  Downgrade (0)  55.1 
Degrees of freedom  18  Upgrade (1)  62.5 
Significance level  .827  Overall    58.8 
 
Variable  Coefficient  S.E.  Wald  Sig.  Exp (B)  VIF 
1.Difference of favourable and unfavourable  -0.004  0.003  2.374  0.123  0.996  2.672 
2.Difference of price- and non price-sensitive  0.001  0.002  0.077  0.781  1.001  7.451 
3.Earnings and results  0.004  0.004  0.967  0.325  1.004  6.191 
4.Outlook  0.003  0.010  0.082  0.775  1.003  4.666 
5.Dividend  -0.076  0.048  2.461  0.117  0.927  2.090 
6.Financing/capital structure  0.002  0.012  0.031  0.859  1.002  2.004 
7.Asset changes  0.002  0.002  0.533  0.465  1.002  1.987 
8.Investment/restructuring  0.004  0.013  0.074  0.785  1.004  1.662 
9.Product  -0.001  0.005  0.061  0.804  0.999  3.286 
10.Government/legal issues  0.011  0.011  1.010  0.315  1.011  1.965 
11.Labour issues  0.011  0.033  0.107  0.744  1.011  1.371 
12.Management  0.003  0.015  0.039  0.843  1.003  2.479 
13.Securities  -0.002  0.011  0.034  0.853  0.998  3.835 
14.Analysts  0.017  0.020  0.673  0.412  1.017  2.317 
15.Reviews  -0.001  0.003  0.132  0.717  0.999  7.642 
16.Others  -0.034  0.034  0.975  0.323  0.967  1.658 
17.Company size  -0.090  0.111  0.661  0.416  0.914  1.680 
18.Industry type = 1  0.258  0.305  0.715  0.398  1.294  1.410 
Constant  1.756  2.234  0.618  0.432  5.789  
 
 
Table 15 shows the regression result on “type of new recommendation”.  Again, the 
model is statistically insignificant, with the significance level of .507.  The goodness of fit of 
the model is defined by its predictive value as 56.9 percent.  Only one variable is statistically 
significant at the conventional level of 5 percent; “dividend” (p-value = .047).  The news on 
“dividend” tends to decrease the chance of revision to “buy” as implied by its negative 
coefficient. 
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Table 15:  Estimated Parameters of LOGIT Probability: Type of New Recommendation on 
News Items (Adjusted Theme Variables) 
 
Dependent variable  Type of new recommendation (RECTYPE)   
Number of observations  255  Pseudo-R square    .087 
-2 Log-likelihood   335.130  Percentage correct predictions:   
Model chi-square  17.241  Non-buy (0)  69.9 
Degrees of freedom  18  Buy (1)  42.0 
Significance level  .507  Overall    56.9 
 
Variable  Coefficient  S.E.  Wald  Sig.  Exp (B)  VIF 
1.Difference of favourable and unfavourable  0.003  0.003  1.038  0.308  1.003  2.672
2.Difference of price- and non price-sensitive  0.003  0.002  2.439  0.118  1.003  7.451
3.Earnings and results  0.004  0.004  0.835  0.361  1.004  6.191
4.Outlook  0.000  0.010  0.001  0.972  1.000  4.666
5.Dividend  -0.100  0.050  3.935  * 0.047  0.905  2.090
6.Financing/capital structure  -0.011  0.013  0.692  0.406  0.989  2.004
7.Asset changes  0.001  0.002  0.215  0.643  1.001  1.987
8.Investment/restructuring  -0.017  0.015  1.349  0.245  0.983  1.662
9.Product  -0.005  0.007  0.633  0.426  0.995  3.286
10.Government/legal issues  0.013  0.011  1.411  0.235  1.013  1.965
11.Labour issues  0.059  0.038  2.452  0.117  1.061  1.371
12.Management  0.024  0.018  1.626  0.202  1.024  2.479
13.Securities  -0.010  0.012  0.693  0.405  0.990  3.835
14.Analysts  0.023  0.022  1.146  0.284  1.023  2.317
15.Reviews  0.003  0.004  0.449  0.503  1.003  7.642
16.Others  -0.016  0.035  0.193  0.660  0.985  1.658
17.Company size  -0.055  0.111  0.242  0.622  0.947  1.680
18.Industry type = 1  0.014  0.312  0.002  0.963  1.015  1.410
Constant  1.033  2.239  0.213  0.645  2.808  
 
Regarding the hypothesis testing, even though the evidence is weak (corresponding with the 
univariate results) the null hypothesis Ho6 can still be rejected because there is evidence that 
several theme variables of news items have a significant impact on recommendation revisions.  
For company size and industry type, in this context of news item, there is no evidence that 
company size or industry type is significantly related to any attributes of recommendation 
revisions.  As a result, the findings suggest that the null hypotheses Ho7 (that there is no 
significant relationship between recommendation revision and company size) and Ho8 (that 
there is no significant relationship between industry type and recommendation revision) 
cannot be rejected; these outcomes correspond with the results reported for the univariate data 
analysis.  
 
4.4.3 Concluding remarks on regression analysis 
 
There are two major reservations regarding the results and conclusions drawn from the 
multivariate analysis which need to be addressed here.     42 
First, the direction of some significant relationships is somewhat paradoxical, especially 
the direction of relationships between recommendation revisions and disclosure on “dividend” 
and “product”, which both report a “negative” relationship.  However, the evidence of these 
relationships, as found for both the correlations in the univariate analysis and the direction of 
coefficient in the multivariate analysis, is not random but consistent throughout the main 
analysis of both announcements and news items.  One possible explanation for these results is 
that “dividend” and “product” disclosures have a positive impact on price changes shortly 
after their announcement (e.g., Morse 1982; Thompson et al. 1987) and so analysts have 
already upgraded their stock recommendations (the old or previous rating) since the time of 
the announcements.  As these disclosures may have already been positively reflected in the 
share price by the market, further recommendation revisions (the new or following rating) 
might be to downgrade, since there is no further basis for analysts to issue more of an upgrade 
revision for the company’s shares. 
 
Second, the rejection of the null hypotheses (especially the null hypotheses Ho5 and Ho6 
concerning the recommendation revisions and the characteristics of disclosures from 
announcements and news items) is made on the basis of statistical models which are overall 
not statistically significant but which include some variables that are significant.  The 
conclusions drawn are tentative, since the evidence of significant relationships is thin, and 
scarcely sufficient to enable the rejection of the null hypothesis.  The circumstances are 
acknowledged and reserved here. 
 
5.   Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the impact of voluntary disclosures on sell-side analyst stock 
recommendation revisions.  Voluntary disclosures include company continuous 
announcements and news reports in the media.  The characteristics of voluntary disclosures 
over the same period of change are examined to determine whether they can explain the 
properties of recommendation revision.  Content analysis is used as a method for the 
measurement of both announcements and news items.   
 
The distribution of sentences in announcements and news (by signal, price-sensitiveness, 
or themes) facilitates comparison of disclosures between these two sources.  Disclosures in    43 
“announcements” are far more positive than in “news”.  There is also a larger number of 
occurrences of non price-sensitive, rather than price-sensitive, disclosures in both sources.  
For the thematic aspect of disclosures, both announcements and news items have some 
themes in common; it can be interpreted that these themes are the types of information that a 
company is apparently keen to disclose and such information is deemed noteworthy to the 
market.  Most of the news in the media is generated directly from company sources, which 
suggests that announcements and news items represent similar content thus giving the 
impression that, to some extent, content in news is only repeating the message from corporate 
announcements.   
 
In order to test the hypotheses, both univariate (correlation) and multivariate (regression) 
analyses are conducted.  The results reject the benchmark null hypothesis and support the 
position that there are relationships between analyst recommendation changes and the 
characteristics of voluntary disclosures.  Ultimately, the main research questions have been 
answered in two ways.  Firstly, there is evidence of a relationship between the number of 
recommendation revisions and volume of voluntary disclosures (sentence counts in company 
announcements and the media.  It explains that the characteristics of disclosures as measured 
by the amount of disclosures are positively associated with the number of recommendation 
revisions.  This suggests that greater disclosure does lead to more accessible and available 
information and hence higher numbers of recommendation revisions for companies.  
Secondly, further evidence in terms of an impact on the nature or attributes of 
recommendation revisions suggests that qualitative characteristics of disclosures (signal, 
price-sensitivity, and theme) do have an impact on the direction and type of new 
recommendation.  The results from both announcements and news items conclusively indicate 
that “favourable” information, “dividend-related” and “product-related” information are the 
most important types of information having an impact on analysts’ recommendation revisions.  
The control variables, company size and industry type, are moderately significantly associated 
with the extent of disclosures, but not significant in relation to the attributes of 
recommendation revisions.   
 
It is noted that the findings of news items in this study consistently report weak 
evidence of relationship between characteristics of disclosures and attributes of 
recommendation revisions compared to those of company announcements.  The evidence is     44 
consistent throughout the analysis in this study.  It can therefore be concluded that the scope 
and level of disclosures in news are of an inferior quality to those in company announcements.  
 
Taken as a whole, the findings can be viewed as providing some fairly clear evidence 
regarding the research question investigated in this paper.  However, there are two 
circumstances on which this study has provided a logical comment.  First, the direction of 
association for “favourable”, “dividend”, or “product” information and attributes of 
recommendation revisions being negative, which implies that the higher incidence of these 
types of messages tends to decrease the chance of an upgrade revision and/or a revision to buy.  
The way that the direction of significant relationships is counter-intuitive could be explained 
by the timing of recommendation revision.  Disclosures relevant to these types of information 
may have triggered positive market reactions as well as positive recommendation revisions 
after the disclosures of such information.  As a result, subsequent revisions might be 
downward.  Second, the extent to which conclusions about rejecting some of the null 
hypotheses (regarding the relationship between recommendation revisions and the 
characteristics of disclosures in announcements and news items) are being made is based on 
some, not all, variables that are significant.   
 
The investigation of the extent of voluntarily disclosed information from company 
announcements and news, as in this study, is expected to yield better measurement of 
voluntary disclosures when compared to previous studies (mostly annual reports).  
Nevertheless, some other sources of disclosures such as conference calls, analyst meetings, 
and private contacts are notably difficult to gain access to.  As a result, the number of 
communication channels is restricted to keep the study manageable.  Future research could 
examine other channels of voluntary disclosures that are not included in this paper.  The data 
collection process has likely compromised the size of the studied sample.  Although the study 
examined in excess of 200 observations of recommendation revisions these were drawn from 
only 40 companies because of the constraints imposed by the hand-collection and human 
coding of data.  In addition, the time period of the study covers only two years (1998-1999) as 
such disclosures in all sources of this study are restricted to this two-year period, also due to 
time constraints.  These limitations may restrict the generalisability of the findings.  It then 
suggests that an expansion of sample size could improve the overall statistical characteristics 
of data and improve the generalisation of the results.  In addition, a further attempt to secure    45 
direct access to analyst research reports could also be a beneficial aspect of additional work in 
this area.     46 
Notes 
 
1.   Voluntary disclosures include company continuous announcements, company news in 
the media and narrative disclosure in annual reports.  In this paper, the scope of 
disclosures from the first two sources are analysed and reported, but their readability is 
not examined. 
 
2.  The index is made up of the weighted share prices of approximately 500 of the largest 
Australian companies.  Established by the ASX at 500 points in January 1980, it is the 
predominant measure of the overall performance of the Australian share market.  The 
companies are weighted according to their size in terms of market capitalisation (total 
market value of a company' s shares) (ASX 2002). 
 
3.   All disclosures in company announcements are labelled (by the company and later 
verified by the ASX) as being either price-sensitive or non price-sensitive information.  
It is noted that Brown et al. (1999) opt to include only the price-sensitive information as 
the proxy for voluntary disclosures in their work. 
 
4.   I/B/E/S uses a five-level recommendation scale (rating): 1 = Strong buy, 2 = Buy, 3 = 
Hold, 4 = Underperform and 5 = Sell. 
 
5.   Holsti (1969, p. 116) describes a theme as a single assertion about some subject.  Weber 
(1990, p. 37) defines a theme as “clusters of words with different meanings or 
connotations that taken together refer to some issue”.  Boyatzis (1998, p. 161) states that 
“a theme is a pattern found in the information that at the minimum describes and 
organises the possible observations or at the maximum interprets aspects of the 
phenomenon”. 
 
6.   The approach used in this study actually applies both “meaning-oriented” and “form-
oriented” analysis.  At first, the sentence is analysed by relying on subjective judgement 
on keywords and the context of the sentence.  Later, all sentences are counted and 
aggregated according to the corresponding category to determine the category 
importance. 
 
7.   Personal email communications in February 2003 with the ASX Customer Service 
officer states that the Company Announcements Office (CAO) at the ASX that decides 
the sensitivity of announcements based on the type and content of reports.  Certain types 
of announcements are always sensitive, e.g., profit reports, takeovers, etc. and others are 
not, e.g., change of address, etc.  For the “grey” area between these extremes, a 
subjective decision by the processing officer is made based on the content of the 
announcement.  Essentially, the judgement is dependent on the individual 
announcement, though all officers naturally attempt to be consistent in their decision-
making across companies.  
 
8    Despite the independence among three categories, the combination across 
categories/elements is recorded for each sentence and the grouping among categories 
can be obtained. 
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9.   In previous research (e.g., Ahmed & Courtis 1999), company size has been measured in 
a number of ways including total assets, total sales, and market capitalisation.  All these 
three size measures are examined in the preliminary analysis.  The correlation between 
each size measure and the level of disclosures are comparable.  In addition, these 
measures are highly correlated to each other; therefore only one measure, “total sales”, 
is selected as a reported proxy for company size in this study. 
 
10.   The comparable ratio for Stickel (1995) is 4.6:1, Womack (1996) is 6.3:1, and Ho and 
Harris (1998) is 5.2:1.     48 
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Appendix A 
 
New theme  Description 
1.  Earnings-related (EARN)  Actual earnings (results) announcement and discussion by 
management 
2.  Forecasts by management (OUTL)  Forecast of earnings by management 
3.  Dividend (DIV) 
 
Dividend announcement 
4.  Financing/capital structure related (FINCAP) 
 
Equity and debt related announcement 
5.  Asset changes (ASSET) 
 
Acquisition and disposition of assets 
6.  Investment/restructuring (INVRES)  Capital expansion and company restructuring 
7.  Product related (PROD) 
 
Marketing, production and sales announcement 
8.  Government and legal issues (GOVLEG)  Impact of government legislation and company legal issues 
9.  Labour related (LABOR)  Issues about employees, negotiation, new work contracts, 
and safety concerns 
10. Management and directors (MGMT)  Changes in management personnel/corporate directors and 
management compensation 
11. Securities related (SEC) 
 
Announcement about company securities, i.e., price 
movement and trading condition 
12. Analyst and forecasts from outside (ALYST) 
 
Analyst comments, i.e., recommendation and forecasts 
13. Review of company/environment (REVIEW)  Comments/review of corporate activities in newspapers 
14. Other company business matters (OTHER)  Miscellaneous information on company business 
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Appendix B:  Illustration of the coding of announcements and news items 
 
Announcement from “Pacifica Group Limited” (PBB): 13 sentences 
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 ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿# ￿￿
$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
& ’  ( ) ￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
. ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿. . $ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 4 ￿5 ￿ 6 ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ 7￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 8 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ +4 ￿5 ￿ 6 ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿ ￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 , ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ *￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿5 = 6 ￿
 
> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 9 ￿ ￿￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , > ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ " ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿A ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿5 ￿ 6 ￿
￿
> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " , ￿ " ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ *￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ 4 ￿ 5 ￿ 6 ￿ B￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ +￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , > ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 ￿ 4 ￿A ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿5 C 6 ￿
￿
> ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ? ; 4 ￿ 5 D 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ *￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ , ￿ +￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 4 ￿ 5 ￿ 6 ￿ B￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ 5 ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , > ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿5 ￿ ￿ 6 ￿
￿
. ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿5 ￿ ￿ 6 ￿E ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿5 ￿ ￿ 6 ￿
￿
E ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿5 ￿ = 6 ￿
 





#  Note 
1  IP  F  PS  establish a joint venture 
2  IP  N  PS  joint venture 
3  AO  N  PS  recent acquisition 
4  BC  N  PS  company 
5  BC  F  PS  market 
6  CO  F  PS  outlook 
7  IP  F  PS  Joint venture to build plant 
8  PD  N  PS  product 
9  PD  N  PS  product 
10  PD  N  PS  product 
11  BC  N  PS  company 
12  BC  N  PS  company background 
13  PD  N  PS  product 
* 
Theme code referred to Appendix A 
^ Signal: F = favourable, N = neutral, U = unfavourable 
# Price-sensitivity: PS = price-sensitive, NS = non price-sensitive 
 